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Abstract 
In this paper we present a systematic study of abductive consequence r lations. We show that a 
monotone abductive consequence r lation satisfies the properties of a cumulative monotonic system 
as defined by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor when the disjunction of all abductive xplanations i
the explanation used to justify the observations. We also show that, in general, for this class of 
abductive consequence relations the Or rule does not hold. We present an example that shows that 
when there are preferences between different abductive xplanations monotonicity does not hold. 
We show that nonmonotonic abductive systems preserve a partial version of rational monotonicity 
and in fact are very similar to rational relations. We also present semantic haracterizations of 
both monotonic and nonmonotonic abductive systems in terms of cumulative models as defined 
by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor. 
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1. Introduction 
Abduction is the process of finding explanations for observable effects in the world. A 
typical abductive process is the selection of a disease or set of diseases as explanation for 
a series of symptoms. Most diagnosis systems perform some kind of abduction to explain 
observations. There are other situations, not necessarily involving diagnosis, where an 
intelligent reasoner may opt to use abduction to draw conclusions. For example, from 
the implication: 
rained_lastnight -+ grass_is_wet 
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and the observation the grass is wet we may hypothesize that it rained last night. 
Generally speaking, there are two parts in an abductive framework (2,Ab): the domain 
theory 2 of laws about the world and a distinguish set of symbols Ab, called abducibles, 
from where the set of possible explanations AbForm will be defined. We will assume 
_Z to be a consistent set of sentences in a finite propositional language C and Ab a 
set of propositional letters from .C. Any formula built using only letters from Ab will 
be an abducible formula in AbForm. Given an observation cy, the process of abduction 
is usually defined [ 3,4, 11, 14,17,20] as the task of finding a consistent subset A of 
AbForm such that ,Z U A k LY. In our example above, 2 will be the implication ( I), (Y 
will be grass-is-wet and A the set {rained_.lastzight}. However, this formal description 
covers only part of the effects one can obtain by abduction. Suppose, for example that 
2 also contains the formula: 
rained_last_.night 4 donotdike-to-work. (2) 
In this case the explanation for grass-is-wet has also as a consequence that we will not 
use the bike to go to work. This second component of abduction can be also observed 
in a diagnostic process where assuming a particular disease to explain certain symptoms 
can trigger as consequence actions for treatment of the disease or actions to perform 
tests to confirm the hypothesis. 
So far, the study of abduction has tried to describe how explanations are drawn and 
has taken little consideration on the consequences of explanations.* If we want to 
consider these consequences we may start by defining a consequence relation based on 
an abductive framework as follows. 
Definition 1.1. Let (_T$,Ab) be an abductive framework. We will say that a formula p 
is an abductive consequence of (Y, CY t& p, if and only if 2 U A 1 p, where A is the 
set of abducible formulas selected to explain LY (and 2 U A is consistent). 
Notice that Definition 1.1 does not specify how to select the set of explanations A. 
The properties of FAb will depend on the way this selection is done. When A is the 
cautious explanation of LY (i.e., the disjunction of all possible explanations), (Y FAb p 
says that every explanation of LY is an explanation of /3. Hence, in a symptom/disorder 
model, the abduction process says that every cause of cy has normally p as a symp- 
tom or consequence too; equivalently, normally each time the symptom cr is observed, 
the symptom p is also present. If there are preferences among the explanations, then 
(Y E,,Q /3 says the most likely (i.e., the preferred) explanation of cy is normally an 
explanation of p. We say “normally” since I-Ah has a “conditional nature”, which is 
due to the fact that our domain theory is incomplete. We will see that when the rea- 
soner has preferences among explanations, then the associated consequence relation will 
not be monotonic (it will be a modification of IAb as given by Definition 1.1) . The 
reasoner epistemic state is considered during the abduction process. This extension to 
* In [S] consequences of the explanations are used to define the notion of corroboration to help the selection 
of possible explanations. An explanation fails to be corroborated if some of its logical consequences are not 
observed. 
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the standard notion of abduction was studied by Boutilier and Becher in [2] in the 
context of finding explanations to observations. However, our emphasis is more on the 
consequence relation implicit in abductive reasoning rather than in the selection of the 
explanations. 
Several researchers have studied abstract properties of nonmonotonic consequence 
relations (see for instance [6,7,15,16,19] ). Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [ 151 and 
Lehmann and Magidor [ 161 have defined several types of consequence relations and 
have developed semantic characterizations of each of them. 
The contribution of this paper is a classification of abductive consequence relations 
according to the systems defined in [ 15,161. We show that a monotone abductive 
consequence relation satisfies the properties of a cumulative monotonic system as de- 
fined in Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [ 151 only when the explanation selected to 
justify the observations is the disjunction of all the abducible explanations. We also 
show that in general for this class of abductive consequence relations the Or rule does 
not hold. We also present an example that shows that when there are preferences be- 
tween different abductive explanations monotonicity does not hold. In fact, we will 
show that the use of preferences will always force the consequence relation to be 
nonmonotonic. In Section 3, we show that nonmonotonic abductive systems preserve 
a partial version of rational monotonicity and that they are very similar to rational 
relations (in the sense of [ 161). We also present semantic characterizations of both 
cumulative and nonmonotonic abductive systems in terms of cumulative models as 
defined in [ 151. In the last section we have some conclusions and directions of re- 
search. 
2. Monotone and cumulative abductive reasoning 
In the absence of extra information, the selection of the correct set of explanations 
for a formula in an abductive framework leads to a formula equivalent to the disjunction 
of all possible explanations. This formula is called the cautious explanation and can be 
formally defined as follows. 
Definition 2.1. Let (2, Ab) be an abductive framework, an abducible formula y is 
called an abductive explanation of a formula cy if 2U {y} is consistent and J$U {y} 1 a. 
The cautious explanation of LY is defined to be the disjunction of all the abductive 
explanations of LY in ( .Z:, Ab) . We will denote this explanation by F,(a). In case there 
is no explanation for LY we let F,(a) = 1. In general, a selection function with respect 
to (2,Ab) will be any function F that maps a formula LY into an abducible formula 
F(a) such that: 
(i) For all (Y, l$U {F(a)} k a and SU {F(a)} IS consistent. In case there is no 
abductive explanation of a then F(a) = 1. 
(ii) If t a +-+ ,f3 then t- F(a) H F(P). 
Let us recall that the underlying language is a finite propositional language. In partic- 
ular, this implies that the cautious explanation is well defined. Also notice that clearly 
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F, satisfies the conditions in Definition 2.1. Condition (i) makes F a selection function, 
since it selects an explanation for LY. (ii) says that the syntax of a is irrelevant when 
selecting one of its explanations. 
Based on this selection function we can define precisely a consequence relation 
associated with an abductive framework. 
Definition 2.2. Let (2, Ab) be an abductive framework and F a selection function 
with respect to ( 2, Ab) . We will say that a formula /? is an F-abductive consequence 
of LY (and will write a J-,C p) iff 2 U {F(a)} k p. When F = F, we will de- 
note this consequence relation by 1~ since the selection of explanations only depends 
on 2. 
There are other properties of the cautious explanations that can be obtained from 
Definition 2.1. We collect three of them in the following fact. 
Fact 2.3. The cautious explanation F,(a) satisfies the following: 
(i) F,(a A P) = F,(a) A FC(P). 
(ii) F,(a) V F,(P) t F,(a VP). 
(iii) For every abducible formula y we have 2 k y H F,(y). That is to say, y t-2 p 
@FXr) t-z P. 
Proof. Straightforward. q 
The simplest deductive systems studied by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor were the 
cumulative systems (C) . A cumulative system has the following properties. 
l Reflexivity: cy b cy. 
l Left Logical Equivalence: if t CY H p & a b S then p k 6. 
l Right Weakening: if k p + 6 & cy k p then LY i_ 6. 
l Cut: if a k p & (Y A p k 6 then (Y b 6. 
l Cautious Monotony: if LY b /? & CY k 8 then CY A p i_ 8. 
It follows directly from the definitions that for every selection function F, k-F satisfies 
Reflexivity and Right Weakening. From Definition 2.1 (ii) it follows that Left Logical 
Equivalence holds for t F. In general, tF does not satisfy Cut and Cautious Monotony 
(see Appendix A for an example). However kz does: from the hypothesis in the rule 
Cut and Fact 2.3 (i) it follows that 2 1 F, ( (Y A /3) c-) F,(a). 
There are other rules that follow from the system C [ 151, and therefore they will 
hold for TV: 
l Supraclassicality: if a t p then (Y b /3. 
l Reciprocity: if LY i_ /? & j? b cy & & i_ 6 then p i_ 6. 
l And: if (Y b p & (Y b p then a k ,8 A p. 
The following observation will clarify the role that the cautious explanation is playing 
in the approach to abductive reasoning we are taking. 
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Fact 2.4. Let (.S,Ab) be an abductive framework and suppose t,~ satisfies system C, 
then for every a, 
Proof. By definition of the cautious explanation F( (Y) t- Fc( a). Since I-F satisfies 
Reciprocity and Supraclassicality it suffices to show that F,(a) I-_F F(a). It is clear 
that a F,v F(a) and since F_F satisfies Right Weakening, then (Y t-.~ F,(a). Also, it is 
easy to see that .Z U {F(F,(a))} t- a, therefore F,(a) J-F a. Hence by Reciprocity 
F,(n) FF F(a). 0 
We can understand Fact 2.4 as follows: in order to have t-~ satisfy the system C the 
function F must select a preferred explanation of Q based only on F,(a). That is to say, 
if LY and cz’ happen to have the same set of possible explanations, then (Y and a! will 
have the same FF-consequences. This might seem a trivial observation, however, the 
point we want to stress is that this property of F,G follows from the requirement that EF 
is a cumulative consequence relation. It is also saying that once we know the cautious 
explanation of (Y, F will select an abductive formula based on the cautious explanation 
independently of (Y. Thus, the observation also says that it suffices to know F restricted 
to AbForm. 
We will continue now presenting some other principles which have been studied in the 
context of nonmonotonic reasoning. We will concentrate on the cumulative relation k2. 
Cautious Monotony is the weakest form of Monotony that has been considered in the 
literature. There are various ways to state Monotony. In [ 151 it is stated as follows: 
l Monotony: if t- cy + /? & p k p then CY k p. 
For t,, Monotony follows from the fact that if k (Y + p, then F(a) t F(P). Cautious 
Monotony follows from Monotony. 
In summary we have: 
Fact 2.5. The consequence relation tz satisfies the rules of system C and Monotony. 
Proof. From Fact 2.3 and the observations above. 0 
The next rule considered by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor that does not follow from 
the rules in C and Monotony is the Or rule. 
l Or: if cz k p & /3 b p then LY V j? i_ p. 
This rule does not hold for FX as we will see below through an example. However, 
the following restricted version of the Or rule holds. 
l Ab-Or: let y, y’ E AbForm; if y b p & y’ i_ p then y V y’ t- p. 
Fact 2.6. The relation Fz. satis$es the rule Ab-Or. 
Proof. It follows from Fact 2.3(iii). 0 
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Before we comment about this last rule, observe that from Fact 2.3(iii) we have 
that y is an explanation of cy iff y kx CY. The rule Ab-Or is important because it 
says that when y and y’ are both explanations of (Y then y V y’ is also an explanation 
of (Y. 
There might be an explanation y of LY V /I that is not a “confirmed” explanation of 
either LY or /3 and therefore it is “natural” to expect that the Or rule fails in general. 3 
A situation where the Or rule fails is illustrated in the following example. In this case, 
although formulas cy and /3 abductively entail a formula p, from the observation (Y V /? 
we cannot draw any specific conclusions. 
Example 2.7. Consider the following domain theory _Z: 
turn_on_car A battery-is-ok -+ engine-starts, 
turn-on_car A Tbattery-is-ok -+ lenginestarts, 
turn-on-car + have-the-keys. 
Let t be turn_on_car, b be batteryis-ok, s be enginestarts and k be have-thekeys. 
Let Ab = {t, b}. It is easy to check that s l-2 k and also that 7s kx k, but obviously 
s V TS yz k. When we observe that the engine starts we conclude that the battery is ok 
and if we observe that the engine does not start then we conclude that the battery is not 
ok, but notice that in either case we are assuming that we have tried to start the engine 
(otherwise it is pointless to look for an explanation) and therefore we must have had 
the keys. This extra information is not available if we just claim that we observe that 
either the engine starts or it does not start. 
Under the presence of the rules in C, Monotony is equivalent to the following rule 
[ 151: 
l Transitivity: if cy b p & p b 6 then (Y i_ 6. 
If the rule Or is also available, then Monotony turns out to be equivalent to Contrapo- 
sition [ 151 : 
l Contraposition: if (Y b p then -/3 b TLY. 
However, without the Or rule, Contraposition is stronger than Monotony [ 151. Since 
12 does not satisfies the Or rule then we only get the following form of contraposition: 
if y is an abducible formula and y l-r LY then SLY k-p 7~. In words, it says that if a 
symptom (Y is not observed, then none of the disorders that normally cause (Y can be 
present. However, sometimes we only can find an explanation for the presence of a 
symptom but not for the absence of it.4 This is the reason why full contraposition fails, 
3 It could be that y sometimes causes LY and sometimes /3 but we do not know which one. We only know 
that y always causes either (Y or p. 
4The grass is wet because it rained last night, but if the grass were not wet maybe it might have been 
because the lawn was covered. But this is an exception that is not explained by the domain theory which is 
supposed to consist of general laws. 
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since even if we know that the expected cause of CY is y (and therefore we abductively 
get that LY tz r), we cannot say that the absence of y implies that LY should not be 
observed (i.e., ly t-z SLY) .
The following example shows that we cannot have full contraposition. 
Example 2.8. Consider the following domain theory that Lisa has about some weather 
related issues. 
sprinkler + wetshoes, 
X= rain ---t wetshoes, 
rain + bring-umbrella. 
Let sprinkler and rain be the abducible atoms. Note that bring-umbrella 12 rain. How- 
ever, if it is not raining Lisa still might want to bring her umbrella (she is very cautious 
about weather reports), and in fact Train yx Tbring-umbrella. 
The main property that distinguishes tz from other consequence relations is that the 
consequences with respect to tz. of a formula (Y depend on the explanations of (Y rather 
than on LY alone. In order to express this property we will introduce an abstract notion 
of cautious explanation with respect to an arbitrary consequence relation k. 
Definition 2.9. Let /-Q be a consequence relation and (2,Ab) an abductive framework. 
The cautious selection function induced by b is defined by 
F(~(cY) = V{y E AbForm: XU {y} is consistent and y i_ a}, 
if there is an abducible formula y such that 2-J {y} is consistent and y k (Y. Otherwise, 
FCp(cu) =i. 
Notice that we only have an indirect reference to _Z in the previous definition. The 
reason is that C is expected to be “built-in” k. For instance, if we let Q b p be defined 
by 2 U {a} t p, then FC’ 1s exactly F, (as defined in Definition 2.1). 
The reader may feel that there is an unnecessary generality in the new definition 
of the cautious explanation, especially because of the use of an abstract consequence 
relation k. The reason to move to this level of generality is because, as we will see, 
the most interesting abductive consequence relations will need to be nonmonotonic. In 
other words, even if we maintain the notion of explanation in the form of 2 U {y} t a, 
after including preferences among explanations, we will end up with a nonmonotonic 
consequence relation. Hence, by not imposing any constraints on b in Definition 2.9 
we will be able to use the same definition of cautious selection functions for monotonic 
and nonmonotonic consequence relations. 
Now we can express the abductive nature of t-1 as follows: 
l Abductive Axiom (AA) : a consequence relation i_ is said to satisfy the Abductive 
Axiom if LY b FC’(a) for every formula a. 
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Remark 2.10. ( 1) The Abductive Axiom can be stated in an equivalent form without 
explicitly mentioning F)’ as follows: As usual, given a consequence relation b, we 
define 
C(a) = (6: a /- 8). 
When k is cumulative and satisfies the Ab-Or rule then AA is equivalent to: LY b S iff 
for every abducible formula y such that y b LY there is an abducible formula y’ such 
that y’ b cy A S and C(y’) = C(y V y’). 
(2) When k satisfies Reciprocity and the Abductive Axiom then cy b S if and only if 
FCb(a) i_ 6. In particular, all conclusions made using b have to be based on abducible 
formulas. 
(3) The following observations may help to clarify the content of the Abductive 
Axiom. Let b be any cumulative consequence relation that satisfies the Ab-Or rule. 
First, given two explanations y and y’ of a formula LY (i.e., y k LY), it is clear that 
y V y’ is also an explanation of cr (by the Ab-Or rule). If we want to be extremely 
cautious about our claims, we should prefer y V y’ over y or y’ as an explanation of a, 
since the former is less specific than the latter. On the other hand, one way to compare 
two explanations is by looking at their consequences. Let us say that an explanation -y’ 
of cy is as good as another explanation y, denoted by y’ 6 y, if C ( y’) = C ( y V y’) . In 
words, we say that the explanation y’ is as good as the explanation y because, after all, 
the conclusions we could draw using the less specific explanation y V y’ are the same 
ones we would get by using the more specific explanation y’. Notice that if y’ < y 
then y V y’ b y’ and also that < is not antisymmetric. This relation (or a variant of it) 
has been used in [ 7,10,15,16] and it has reminiscences of the simplicity criterion for 
selection of explanations in [ 171. Now, we rephrase the Abductive Axiom as follows: 
S can be abductively deduced from CY if and only if for any abductive explanation y 
of (Y there is an explanation y’ of LY as good as y such that 6 follows abductively 
from y’. 
The following fact is obvious from the definition of 1~. 
Fact 2.11. The consequence r lation k-p satisfies the Abductive Axiom. 
In general, 2 can be considered to contain the world’s current laws used by the 
reasoner to justify explanations and draw conclusions. Hence, for every u E Z and 
every LY, we have cy t-2 (T. This can be understood as saying that 2 must hold in every 
state considered by the reasoner as a possible state of affairs. In particular, this implies 
that when _Z t a --) p, then a t-2 /? holds (this follows easily using And and Right 
Weakening). Also, it implies that if 2 U { } a 1s inconsistent, then LY txl. The converse 
is not true in general (for instance, when (Y has no explanation), however it holds for 
those abducible formulas that are consistent with 2:. We will state it as a separate rule, 
since it will be needed in the sequel. 
l Ab-Consistency: if y is an abducible formula and y k_L then S U {y} is inconsis- 
tent. 
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In [lo] a similar axiom is called “Preservation of Consistency”. This condition will 
be also reflected in the semantic side of the representation theorem. 
Since kx satisfies the rules of a cumulative system we can present a semantic char- 
acterization of 1: based on simple cumulative models as in [ 151. 
Definition 2.12 (see [ 151). A simple cumulative model is a pair (S, 1) where S is a 
set (its elements are called states) and 1 is a function that assigns to each state s E S 
a non-empty collection I(s) of interpretations of the language. For every formula a we 
let 
& = {s E S: l(s) C Mod(o)}, 
i.e., s E & if for every N E l(s) we have N /= (Y. Given a simple cumulative model 
W = (S, 1) the associated consequence relation is defined as follows: 
LY kw p iff for all s E & we have I(s) C Mod(p). 
In [ 151 it was shown that a consequence relation satisfies the rules of C together with 
the monotonicity rule (this system is denoted by CM) if and only if the consequence 
relation is of the form bw for some simple cumulative model W. We will show a similar 
representation theorem for abductive relations. 
Theorem 2.13. Let (2,Ab) be an abductive framework and i_ a consequence relation. 
The following are equivalent: 
(i) i_ satisjes the rules of system CM (i.e., it is a cumulative monotonic rela- 
tion), the rule Ab-Or, the Abductive Axiom, Ab-Consistency and the following 
constraint: for every cr E 2 and every a, a k cr. 
(ii) There is a simple cumulative model W = (S, 1) such that i_= bw where S is the 
collection of abducible formulas consistent with 2, for every y, y’ E S we have 
I(Y) C Mod(ZU {Y}), l(yV Y’) = l(y) U /(Y’) and l(y) nMod(y’) C l(y’). 
(iii) There is a domain theory 2 2 2 such that for every abducible formula y, 
2 U {y} is consistent if and only if 2’ U {y} is consistent, and b= FL,. 
Proofs of the theorems can be found in Appendix B. However, we should point 
out that Theorem 2.13 is a corollary of a more general result presented in the next 
section. 
Let us make some remarks about conditions (ii) and (iii) in the previous theorem. 
The function 1 is giving the intended meaning of the abducible formulas in S. In other 
words, models in l(y) are those models of y that the reasoner thinks are relevant, 
appropriated, normal, etc., and only those models will be considered. In our case, they 
have to be models of 2 U {y}. Thus, a limiting case in the previous theorem is when 
l(y) = MO42 u {Y}), which corresponds to b=t--2_. However, it could be that I(y) 
does not include all models of Mod( 2 U (7)). In this case 2’ contains extra constraints 
that forces to leave out of l(y) some of those models. Hence, the axioms listed in (i) 
do not determine uniquely the domain theory used by the agent to draw conclusions and 
justify explanations, although the domain theory 2’ in (iii) must contain _Z and both 
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have to determine the same set of consistent explanations (i.e., _SU {y) is consistent iff 
2’ U {y} is consistent). 
The last condition in (ii) above says that if a normal model of y is also a model of 
y’ then it has to be a normal model (of y’) . The extra condition is necessary in order 
to get the rule Ab-Or. We recall here that in general a simple cumulative model does 
not induce a relation that satisfies Or (in fact, in [ 151 in order to get the Or rule Z(s) 
was restricted to contain only one model). 
So far, we have studied abductive reasoning assuming that there are no preferences 
among the explanations. However, for the most interesting situations this is not the case. 
We will present next an example that shows that there are consequence relations naturally 
defined using abductive reasoning that are not represented by simple cumulative models, 
i.e., that are not monotonic. 
Consider the following scenario: Lisa lives in a high-rise and parks her car in the 
16-floor parking garage of her building. One morning, Lisa was looking for her car 
and did not find it where she thought she left it the night before. She considered the 
possibility that she was in the wrong floor and went to the next floor. There was also the 
possibility that the car was stolen and she must had called the police, but Lisa looked 
for the elevator and went to the next floor instead before taking the extreme decision of 
calling the police. We could model part of her domain theory as follows: 
Tright_Jloor --t -cur, 
stolen-car ---$ Tear, 
Tright-Jloor + godonext-joor, 
stolen-car + calLpolice. 
In this situation she made a decision based on abductive reasoning but she also preferred 
to believe TrightJloor over stoleruar. Hence, she has implicitly assumed an order in 
the possible explanations for Tear. However, if Lisa had used the kind of reasoning we 
have applied so far instead of her own she would not know what to do when she did not 
find the car. She could have either called the police or gone to the next floor. In order to 
introduce priorities among explanations and being able to select “go to the next floor” 
it is necessary to leave the system CM to accommodate orders in the set of states. The 
new consequence relation will not be characterized by a simple cumulative model, and 
we will need to forfeit Monotony. The new ordering coincides with the intuition given 
by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [ 151 to cumulative models (not necessarily simple) 
where states are taken to be possible states of affairs and the order relation represents the 
preferences between different states the reasoner may have. In the situation of abductive 
consequence relations the states refer to possible causes or explanations. 
3. Putting some order in the explanations 
As we have shown in Fact 2.4, in order to have a well behaved consequence relation 
one must be careful in the criteria used to select explanations. We have shown that 
the selection function should select a formula from a set of abducible explanations of 
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(Y, based only on F, (cu). This happens, for instance, when there is an order < of the 
abducible formulas and F(a) picks the G-minimal explanations of (Y. The formalisms 
presented in this section will follow this idea. Furthermore, the order will be a possibility 
ordering [ 61 over the abducible formulas. 
A consequence relation can be seen as an order over the set of formulas, and con- 
versely, some orders (epistemic entrenchment, possibility ordering or preferential orders, 
etc.) are a way of encoding an inference relation (see [ 6,7, lo] ). There is no differ- 
ence with our approach to abductive consequence relations. The preference relation 
among abducible formulas will be a possibility ordering and its associated inference 
relation will be part of the abductive consequence relation. Hence, the order among 
the abducible formulas can be recuperated from the consequence relation. It has been 
shown that consequence relations based on orders are not monotonic. In Lisa’s exam- 
ple, this is equivalent to say that she is using a nonmonotonic consequence relation’ 
as a background inference relation. Another example that shows the nonmonotonicity 
nature of abduction with preferences among the explanations is the following. In Lisa’s 
situation we have that +ght$oor b lstofen_car (“normally, when Lisa is not in the 
right floor, her car has not been stolen”), because this is a way of expressing that she 
prefers +ghtJioor over stolen-cur. But, on the other hand, this should not imply that 
+ghtJloor A stolen-car is a contradiction, i.e., Lisa’s reasoning is not monotonic. 
We will introduce the class of models we use to capture preferences among the 
explanations. This will be done by means of an order among the models of the domain 
theory which will translate into an order among the explanations. We will use the 
following notion of cumulative model: 
Definition 3.1 (see [ 151 6 ). A cumulative model is a triple (S, 1,4) where S is a 
set (its elements are called states), 1 is a function that assigns to each state s E S a 
collection I(s) of interpretations of the language and -X is a binary asymmetric relation 
over S. ’ For every formula (Y we define B as before by 
iu = {s E S: Z(s) c: Mod(cu)}. 
With every cumulative model W = (S, 1, 4) the associated consequence relation is 
defined as follows: 
cx bw j? iff for all s E Min(iu, -x) we have I( S) & Mod(P), 
where s E Min(B, -x) if s E ~5 and there is no t E & with t < s. 
The difference between cumulative models and simple cumulative models is that in the 
latter there is no relation among the states. In the case under consideration, the relation 
+ will be a pre-order that encodes the reasoner preferences between explanations. 
5 For “jumping to explanations”. 
h In [ 15 1 there is an extra technical condition imposed in the models called smoothness that always hold 
when -C is an order and S is finite, which is our case, and therefore we do not use. 
’ A relation 3 is called asymmetric if for every s and I in S such that s < I, we have r # s. 
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We will use a particular type of cumulative models. Let ( ,X,Ab) be an abductive 
framework and suppose we are given a total pre-order8 on Mod(Z), denoted by Go. 
Define a cumulative model as follows: The set of states S will be the collection of 
abducible formulas consistent with _Z. Now define 1 : S + 2Mod(z) by 
l(y) = Min(Mod(X U {y}), <I) 
and define 5 in S by 
Y 5 Y’ iff I(Y) C l(y V r’). 
The strict relation -X is defined as usual by y < y’ iffy 5 y’ and y’ 8 y. It is clear that 
4 is asymmetric. 
The motivation behind this choice of I and 4 comes from the theory of belief revision 
(see Section 4). In fact _( is a reversed possibility ordering (which is a dual notion of 
epistemic entrenchment, see [ 6,101). 
Definition 3.2. Let (2, Ab) be an abductive framework and S, 1 and 4 be defined as 
before. We call the cumulative model W = (S, 1, <) an abductive cumulative model. 
Remark 3.3. If 62 is trivia1 (i.e., IV <I h4 for every N and M), then + is the 
empty relation and TV= kw. Notice that for this particular case & = {y E S: y Ez (Y}, 
so & is the set of explanations of LY. We will keep this terminology and call any 
formula in ii an abducible explanation of LY and the disjunction of all formulas in & 
the cautious explanation of cy. In this respect, the formulas in Min(&, 4) are the most 
likely explanations of (Y. The rational behind the definition of bw is precisely to use 
the disjunction of all most likely explanations of cy as the preferred explanation. 
Example 3.4. Let us go back to the example of Lisa’s car. Let _Z be her domain theory. 
To simplify notations, let us denote right&or with Y, stolen-cur with s and cur with 
c. So the abducible atoms are r and s. In this case an (optimistic) preference relation 
<L is given by N <z M iff N k 1~ A IS, for N and M models of Z. Let W be the 
corresponding abductive cumulative model. Then YC k,,, 7r /\ 1s as expected. Also, 
lc A r kw s, hence i-W is not monotonic. Observe that 7c YZ n and lc YZ up. We 
can define a selection function F based on the order over abducible formulas given 
implicitly by 61. For instance, F(Tz) = -r A 7s and the bw-consequences of -C are 
the classical consequences of _Z U {F(T) }. In other words, for this particular example, 
i_, is of the form F,c. 
Notice, we could have chosen a slightly different order on Mod( 2). For instance, 
N & M iff N k 1s. The consequence relation bt,, will be different, but we still have 
TC 
h 
+-A 7s. 
Abductive cumulative models are actually ordered models (i.e., 4 is a transitive 
relation), as we will show below. Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor showed in [IS] that 
* A pre-order is a transitive and reflexive binary relation. 
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the consequence relation defined by an ordered model satisfies the rules of C together 
with the rule Loop (see below). This new system is called CL. We will see that when 
W is an abductive cumulative model then bt,, has even more properties than just the 
system CL. We state now other rules that are studied in [ 1.51. We will also show that 
these rules (or partial versions of them) are satisfied by b-W. 
l Loop:ifackat &al /v(~*&...&(~,~~~~thencrojua,, 
l Rational Monotony: if (Y b -p & LY i_ y then (Y A p k y. 
The next theorem shows that kw is almost a rational relation [ 161, i.e., in addition 
to the rules of C the consequence relation also satisfies Or and Rational Monotony. 
Rational relations are considered the best ones one could expect from a nonmonotonic 
consequence relation. 
Theorem 3.5. Let (2,Ab) be an abductive framework, <z be a total pre-order on 
Mod( 2) and W = (S, I,+) be the corresponding abductive model. The consequence 
relation bw satisfies the following axioms: ReJlexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right 
Weakening, Cut, Cautious Monotony, Loop, Ab-Consistency, the Ab-Or rule and the 
Abductive Axiom. Also the following partial form of Rational Monotony: 
a Rational Monotony for abducibles: if y and y’ are abducible formulas and y F, 
my’ and y i-W 6 then y A y’ kw 6. 
Also the following constraint holds: for every formula (T E Z and every formula o, 
ff&r 
The proof appears in Appendix B. Let us only mention a couple of facts about the 
proof. Let W = (S, I,+) be an abductive cumulative model. For every formula CY with 
& # 0, define F(cu) = V{y: y E &} and Fo((Y) = V{y: y E Min(&,+)}. It is easy 
to see that F(a) is the cautious explanation of (Y with respect to bw. By definition 
of bw we have C(U) = C(Fo(a)) and also C((Y> = C(F(LY)) (this says that the 
Abductive Axiom holds). In other words, the cautious explanation of cz (with respect 
to t_,) is k,-equivalent to a more specific explanation, namely Fe(a). It also follows 
from the proof that C(y) = C (F( y) ), for every abducible formula y, and in fact 
Mod( C ( y) ) = I( y) . This is to say, the original interpretation of an abductive formula 
given by 1 is preserved. 
We actually have a representation theorem for this kind of consequence relations as 
we will show next. We introduce the following notion, which correspond in our setting 
to the rational consequence relation of Lehmann and Magidor. 
Definition 3.6. A consequence relation k will be called an abductive rational relation 
if it satisfies all the properties listed in the conclusion of Theorem 3.5. 
Remark 3.7. When the premises in the relation bt,, are abducible formulas the relation 
has all the properties of a rational consequence relation. In particular, we have the 
following two rules which were shown in [ 1.51 to hold for any rational consequence 
relation. Let y and y’ be abducible formulas: 
162 J. Lube, C. Uzcdtegui/Artijiciul Intelligence 89 (I 997) 149-l 71 
l Rule S: if y A y’ bt+, 8 then Y bw (Y’ + 8, 
. Disjunctive Rationality: if y p,+, 6 8~ Y’ bLw 8 then Y V Y’ bc, 6. 
Now we state the other direction of the representation theorem for abductive rational 
relations. 
Theorem 3.8. Let (2, Ab) be an abductive framework and k be a consequence relation 
on a finite propositional language. If k is an abductive rational relation then there is 
an abductive model W such that k= kW. 
The proof is in Appendix B. However, as in other proofs of representation theorems 
of this kind [ 7,10,16], the heart of the proof consists of finding an order 62 derived 
from a consequence relation k as in the hypothesis of the theorem. So let us indicate 
how 61 is defined. Following [ 151, an interpretation N is called normal if there is an 
abducible formula y such that N b C(y). From one of the hypotheses we get that in 
particular normal interpretations are models of 2. We will define <,r only on normal 
interpretations, and then the rest of the models of 2 will be located above any normal 
interpretation. Let Nt and N2 be normal interpretations, we define ~2‘ first as follows: 
NI <r NT if and only if for all yt and yz such that Nt + C( 71) and N2 + C( ~2) 
then Nl != C(YI V ~2) and N2 P C(Y~ V ~2). 
Then we define =x naturally by making Nt =z N2 if and only if Ni $2 N?: and 
N2 fl: Nr. And finally & is defined by Nr <x N2 if and only if Ni =x N2 or 
Nt <X N2. 
Remark 3.9. Notice that when Z is the empty domain theory and Ab is the set of all 
propositional letters then bw is a rational consequence relation. Notice also that in this 
case S will be the set of all consistent formulas and 4 will be (the strict part of) a 
reversed possibility order (see [ 6, lo] for definitions, references and its connection with 
expectation orders). As in [ 71 it can be shown that (Y kt+, /? iff (Y -X (Y A -/3. 
4. Connection with belief revision 
Belief revision is the process of changing the beliefs an agent has in order to in- 
corporate incoming information (which might contradict the old one). The best known 
formalism for revision theory is the so called AGM postulates [ 11. Let K be the belief 
set of an agent (for instance K could be identified with a propositional theory) and 
suppose that the new incoming information is represented by a formula (Y. The revision 
of K with (Y is denoted by K * LY. It is natural to assume that K * LY is also a belief 
set (i.e., closed under logical consequences) and obviously that (Y E K * a. The AGM 
postulates impose other nontrivial conditions on * in order to make minimal the changes 
it performs in K. For instance, if a is consistent with K then K * (Y E Cn( K U {a}). 
There is also a semantic characterization of these operators that is equivalent to the 
postulates. This characterization says that the operators must induce an order among 
the interpretations of the language. The order intends to capture the “distance” of the 
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interpretations from the models of K. The revision operator must select the “closest” 
interpretations to the models of K that model LY as the models of the revised belief 
set. 
It has been shown by Gkdenfors and Makinson [9] that a revision operator is a 
consequence relation in disguise (and vice versa, some consequence relations can be 
represented as those coming from revision operators). More precisely, we can define 
(Y i_, p if p E K * a. In words, the agent is willing to conclude /? from LY in the case 
that /? belongs to the revised belief set obtained after (Y is incorporated into K (using 
the revision operator *). In [9] it is shown that kK is a rational consequence relation. 
This is a very interesting result, since it shows that the AGM postulates and some of 
the axioms for nonmonotonic consequence relations are “two sides of the same coin”. 
Our original motivation to study abductive consequence relations came from the fact 
that in revision theory it is possible to use abductive reasoning to revise a belief set. 
This approach was used in [ 181 to provide a notion of abductive revision operators. The 
idea is that given an abductive framework (2,Ab) and a belief set K that contains Z 
we can incorporate a formula (Y using abduction as the basic reasoning mechanism. The 
operators so defined have properties that resemble the AGM postulates. It can be shown 
that if *cl is an abductive revision operator and we let a k,, p when /3 E K *n a’, then 
k,, is an abductive rational relation. The operators *<, are represented by total pre-orders 
over Mod(X) and this provides the intuition behind the definition of + and 1 in the 
notion of an abductive cumulative model defined in Section 3. 
5. Conclusions and further remarks 
We have presented a study of consequence relations that model some form of abductive 
reasoning. We have divided our presentation in two cases: Monotone and nonmonotone 
following ideas from [ 15,161. Even though the monotonic case seems to be of lesser 
importance, its simplicity allowed us to introduce easily the basic features of abduction 
that we have chosen as the key postulates of our consequence relation. For instance: 
(1) The restricted form of the Or rule that we have called Ab-Or. This rule merely 
says that if an observation cr has y and y’ as explanations then y V y’ is also an 
explanation. It is important to recall that the failure of the full Or rule means that, in 
general, we do not ask that the preferred explanation of a disjunctive fact (Y V /3 has 
to be an explanation of either (Y or /3. In other words, the process of explaining (Y v /3 
might be a completely different task than that of explaining LY or /?. (2) Even more 
important, perhaps, is the Abductive Axiom AA since it seems to capture the “essence” 
of the notion of abduction we are considering. This postulate simply says that a form of 
reasoning defined in terms of a consequence relation k can be called abductive when 
from every observation cy one is able to infer the disjunction of all possible explanations 
of LY, where the notion of explanation is defined based on b. From the view point 
of abduction when it is understood as the inference to the best explanation, AA is a 
weak requirement. However, as the representation theorem shows, AA together with 
the rest of the rationality postulates capture a very precise notion of preference among 
explanations. 
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There are some natural questions that emerge from our results. The representation 
theorem presented in Section 3 ordered the models to encode the preferences among 
the explanations. But note that in Lisa’s example the order was generated not based 
on semantic considerations but on an order over the explanations. Previous studies of 
nonmonotonic consequence relations have considered the use of expectation or possi- 
bility orders among the formulas to generate consequence relations (see [6,7, lo] ). 
We are currently preparing an article where these issues are studied in more detail. In 
particular, it will include the study of relations of the form F,c, where F is defined 
based on orders over sets of formulas. The study of these relations will bring closer 
our approach of abduction to other approaches in the literature (for instance, the work 
of Cialcea and Pirri [3], where they study properties of the relation “y is a preferred 
explanation of a”). 
Another open question is how to deal with infinite languages. The main obstacle 
is that the cautious explanation is ill defined and thus AA is meaningless. However, 
there is a way to state AA that avoids the problem of defining the cautious selection 
function. Another question is up to which extent a consequence relation determines the 
abductive framework. For instance, is the set of abducibles or the domain theory uniquely 
determined by i_?. Some results about those questions will be presented elsewhere. 
Another limitation of the abductive consequence relations presented here is that when 
a formula cx does not have explanations the set of abductive consequences of (Y is 
inconsistent. Hence, consistency is not preserved even when LY and .X are consistent. 
An alternative to attack this limitation would be to modify the abductive framework 
by expanding the language with new abducible propositional letters and extending the 
domain theory in order to have explanations for more formulas than in the original 
theory. The procedure can be seen as a kind of completion for the theory to have 
explanations for every formula. 9 This approach has been explored in [ 141 and also in 
[ 121 but restricted to logic programming type of theories. How exactly we could define 
this completion is an open question. 
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Appendix A. A non-cumulative abductive relation 
The following example shows that when F is not the cautious explanation then TV 
does not necessarily satisfies the rules Cut and Cautious Monotony. We have shown that 
if F is the cautious selection function then the relation !--, satisfies the system C. 
Example A.l. Consider the following domain theory. 
a ---t p, 
z(= 
a + 4, 
q -+ r, 
b+pAr. 
Let Ab = {a, b} and define F(p) = a, F(p A r) = b, F(y) = y for every y E AbForm 
and extend F to the other formulas in such a way that F becomes a selection function 
for 2 (i.e., (i) and (ii) in Definition 2.1 hold). Then it is easy to check that p tr a, 
p t,= r, but p A r Yr a. That is to say, Cautious Monotony does not hold. Similarly, 
p A r tr b but p Yr b, thus Cut does not hold either. Notice that even if we select 
a different function G such that G(p) = a V b, which seems to be more natural, and 
also we let G(p A r) = b, then now we do not have problems with Cautious Monotony, 
however Cut still fails: p A r F_G b, p to r but p I/a b (we just have p to (a V 6) ) 
Appendix B. Proofs 
The proof of the main result uses ideas from similar representation theorems for 
consequence relations [ 7,10,16]. The original idea to define the order of MO& 2;) 
came from the proof of the representation theorem for AGM operators given in [ 131. 
Theorem 3.5. Let (2,Ab) be an abductive framework, 62 be a total pre-order on 
Mod( 2) and W = (S, I,+) be the corresponding abductive model. The consequence 
relation bw, satisfies the following axioms: Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right 
Weakening, Cut, Cautious Monotony, Loop, Ab-Consistency, the Ab-Or rule, Rational 
Monotony for abducible formulas and the Abductive Axiom. Also the following constraint 
holds: for every formula o E 2 and every formula a, a kw u. 
Proof. We will show that W is an ordered model and from this it will follow that 
Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Cut, Cautious Monotony and 
Loop hold for i-W (see [ 151). We only need to verify that < is transitive. Recall 
that S is the set of abducible formulas consistent with 2 and for every y E S, l(y) = 
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Min(Mud(Xu {y}),<z). And 5 is defined by y 5 y’ iff l(y) i l(y Vy’). Finally, 
recall that y 4 y’ iff y 5 y’ and y’ $ y. 
The following fact will show to be useful. 
Fact B.l. Let y and y’ be in S. 
(i) y 3 y’ ifs I(y) = 1( y V y’) and l(y) C Mud( -y’). 
(ii) One of the following holds: 
(a) l(y V Y’) = l(y), 
(b) /(Y V Y’) = I(Y’) or 
(c) l(Y V Y’) = l(Y) U l(Y’). 
(iii) Ifl(y) nl(yV y’) Z 0 then l(y) 5 l(yV y’). 
(iv) lfy 5 y’ and y’ 3 y then Z(yV y’) =I(y) Ul(y’). 
Proof. It follows from the definitions. 0 
Fact B.2. The relations -X and 3 are transitive. Moreover, 3 is total. 
Proof. Direct from Fact B. 1. 17 
We recall that from the axioms of C we obtain that And and Reciprocity hold. To 
see that the partial form of consistency preservation holds, notice that if y E S then 
l(y) + 0, hence y &l. 
The following fact will be useful. 
Fact B.3. Let y be in S. y /-+, 6 ifs l(y) C Mod(G). Moreover, if y’ E Min(?, +), 
then I(y’) C l(y). Hence l(y) = U{l(y’): y’ E Min(?, +)}. 
Proof. Notice first that if y’ E y then 1( y’) C Mod(y) Therefore, 1( y V y’) = l(y) 
since 
(since I( y’) (I Mod( 2 U {y}) ). From here we get that y 5 y’. When y E Min(q, -x) 
from Fact B.l(iv) we have that l(yV y’) = Z(y) U/(y’). Thus Z(y) = U{l(y’): y’ E 
Min(y, 4)) from which the claim follows. 0 
From Fact B.3 it follows that when y E S, then I(y) = Mod( C ( y) ) . Now, the Ab-Or 
rule follows from Facts B.l (ii) and B.3. 
To verify the partial form of Rational Monotony, let y and y’ be abducible formulas 
such that y pw 1~‘. We claim I( y A y’) = Z(y) n Mod( y’): if N E Z(y) n Mod( y’), 
then N E 1 (y A y’), since N is &-minimal. Finally, if y bw 6, then from the claim it 
follows that Z( y A y’) C: Mod(S) and from Fact B.3 we get y A y’ kt+, 6. 
To verify the Abductive Axiom we will use the following fact. 
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Fact B.4. For every formula a with ii # 8 define F(a) = V(y: y E &} and Fo( a) = 
V(y: y E Min(&, d)}. Let FL be the cautious selection function with respect to bw 
(as defined in Definition 2.9). Then: 
(i) l(F(a)) = Z(Fo(a)). 
(ii) l(Fo(a)) = U{l(y): y E Min(G, 4)). 
(iii) cy kw 6 @F(a) i-W S. 
(iv) F~((Y) = F(a). 
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from the definitions. (iii) follows from (i), (ii) and Fact 
B.3. Now, it is easy to check that (iv) holds. 0 
From the previous fact the Abductive Axiom follows easily. 
Finally, from the definition of 1 we have that l(y) C Mod(X), hence cy i_, g for 
every (Y and every B E 2. 0 
Theorem 3.8. Let ( 2, Ab) be an abductive framework and k be a consequence relation 
on a finite propositional language. If k is an abductive rational relation, then there is 
a abductive model W such that /-J= &. 
Proof. We will show first some facts that will be used later. Some of them are well 
known, we will include the proofs for the sake of completeness. Unless otherwise 
specified the letter y will always denote abducible formulas. The following property 
was called in [ 81 the factorization property. 
Fact B.5 (see [ 81) Let k be any abductive rational relation, then for every abducible 
formulas y and y’ one of the following holds: 
(i) C(y V y’) = C(y). 
(ii) C(y V y’) = C(y’). 
(iii) C(yVy’) =C(y) flC(y’). 
Proof. We consider three cases. (i) If y V y’ k -y’, then from Reflexivity, And and 
Right Weakening we have y V y’ k y. Thus by Reciprocity C(y V y’) = C(y). (ii) 
Analogously, if y V y’ k my, then C(y V y’) = C( y’). (iii) If y V y’ p my’ and 
y V y’ /h my, then we will show that C (y V y’) = C(y) n C (y’). One direction follows 
directly from the rule Ab-Or. For the other direction observe that if y V y’ i_ 6 then 
by Rational Monotony (y V y’) A y /-- 8 and also (y V y’) A y’ b S. By Left Logical 
Equivalence y b 6 and also y’ b 6, therefore C ( y V y’) C C(y) n C ( y’) . Cl 
Fact B.6. Ify b-y’, then C(yA y’) =Cn(C(y) U{y’}). 
Proof. Let 6 E C(y), then by Rational Monotony we have S E C( y A y’). Thus 
Cn( C( y) U {y’}) C C(y A y’). For the other direction, if y A y’ b 6 then by Rule S 
in Remark 3.7 we have y k y’ -+ S. Therefore 6 E Cn(C(y) U {y’}). 0 
We will define now an ordering on Mod( 2). First we will introduce the following 
definition as in [ 151. 
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Definition B.7. An interpretation N is called normal if there is an abducible formula y 
such that N k C(y). 
Notice that if N is normal, then N k 2, since for every formula (Y and cr E z1 we 
assume that (Y i_ (T. 
Definition B.S. Let N1 and N2 be normal interpretations, we define <r, =J and <z as 
follows: 
l Nt <I N2 if and only if for all yt and y2 such that NJ j= C(yt) and N2 k C(y2) 
then NI k C(yl Vy2) and N2 k C(YI Vy2). 
l N, =z N2 if and only if Nt {z N2 and N2 $2 NI. 
l N1 <Z N2 if and only if N1 =z N2 or Nt <A N2. 
Fact B.9. 
(i) Let N and M be normal models. Then N <I M if and only if there are yN and ye 
abducible formulas such that N k C (ye) , M k C ( ye ) and N b C ( yN V ye) 
but M k C(y, v7M.i). 
(ii) In consequence, for N and M normal models, N =x M if and only if for all 
abducible formulas y and y’ such that N + C(y) , M b C( y’) , we have N, 
M +C(yVy’). 
Proof. (i) The if part comes directly form the definition of <z. For the other direction 
suppose that such yN and yM exist and let y and y’ be any abducible formulas such 
thatN+C(y) andMkC(y’).FromFactB.5wegetthatyVy’kT(y,vVyM)and 
also yN V ye k -(y V y’). Hence from Fact B.6 we get that 
c((YNVY~)A(YVy’))=Cn(C(yVy’)U{YNVYM}) 
=cn(c(YNvyMM) u{Yvy’}) 
and from this the result follows. (ii) follows from (i). 0 
Fact B.10. The relation <A is transitive. 
Proof. Let Nt <z N2 and N2 <x Ns and assume toward a contradiction that Nt $2 
Ns. Then there exist yt, y3 such that Nt k C (~1) and N3 k C( y3) but either Nr p 
C(YI V ~3) or N3 k= C(YI V ~3). 
Suppose Nt k C(yt V ys), then from Fact B.5 we have that C(yt V yj) = C(ys). 
Now, since N2 is a normal model there exists y2 such that N2 k C(yz). Then, since 
N2 ~2 N3 and N3 + C(y) V ~3) we have that N2 k C(yl Vy2 Vy3). And, again since 
Nt + C(yt), and Nt <x N2 then it must be the case N2 &t C(yt V y2 V yj), which is 
a contradiction. 
Suppose N3 + C( yt V ys) and let y2 be such that N2 /= C(y2). Since N2 <I Ns 
then NT k C(yt V y2 V ~3). But since Nt <r N2 and Nt + C( yt ) then it must be the 
case that N2 F C(y, V y2 V y3) which is a contradiction. q 
Fact B.11. The relation =x is an equivalence relation. 
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Proof. By definition the relation is reflexive and symmetric. The interesting case is 
when N, $ N2 and N2 $ Ns. Let Ni =x N2 and N2 =x Ns. We will find y{ , y& such 
that Ni + C(yi), N3 k C(yi) and Nl,Ns b C(yl V ys), then we will have that 
Nr flz N3 and Ns #A Nr, and thus Nr =x NT. Let ~1, ~2, y3 be abducible formulas 
such that Nj + C( yi), for i = 1,2,3 (these y exist since the Ni are normal models). 
Since N2 =z N3 then from Fact B.9(ii), we get N2, N3 b C(y2 V ys), Similarly 
NI,N~~((Y~VY~VY~) and&,& ~~Y~VY~VY~).T~~~Y’,=Y~=Y~VY~VY~. 0 
Now, we prove that <z. is a total pre-order. Reflexivity comes from the reflexivity 
of =x. For Transitivity, let Ni 61 N2 and N2 62 Ns. We have four cases. (1) When 
N, =\‘ N2 and N2 =z N3 , then Nt =z Ns follows from Fact B.11. (2) If Ni =x N2 
and N2 ~2‘ Ns, the only case to consider is when N3 <r Ni, but this case is impossible 
since by transitivity of <z we have that N2 <z N1 contradicting the fact that N1 =z N2. 
(3) When Nr <z N2 and N2 =z N3, the situation is analogous to the second case. (4) 
When N, <L N2 and N2 <x Ns, Nt <I N3 follows from the transitivity of <x. 
We extend <x to a pre-order over all models of 2 as follows: If N is normal and M 
is a not normal model of 2, then N <x M and every two nonnormal models of 2 are 
=x. It is clear that the extended relation & is a total pre-order. Let then W = (S, 1, +) 
as defined in Definition 3.2 using the pre-ordering 62. We will show next that b= bw. 
First, we show that for any y we have 
Mod(C(y)) =Minwf~dwJ{Y})A), 
in particular this says that for y E S, Mod(C( y)) = Z(y). Notice that when y is 
not consistent with 2 there is nothing to show because from the assumption about 
consistency preservation in this case IE C(y). So we can assume that y E S. Let 
Normal(y) be the collection of all normal models of y (from the remark above, for 
every abducible formula y E S, Normal(y) is not empty). It follows from the definition 
of <L that 
Thus we have to show that for an abducible formula y E S, 
Mod(C(y)) =Min(Normal(y),<~). 
(C) By contradiction assume that M E Mod( C( y)) but M $ Min(Nomal( y), <l). 
Then there is N <z M with N E Min(Normal( y), &). Then for any yi such that 
N /= C(yi), N b C(yt V y) and M k C(yi V y). Hence yi V y k my (since N is not 
a model of -y>. Therefore from Fact B.6 and Left Logical Equivalence we have 
C(Y) = C((Yl v Y) A Y) = WC(Yl v Y) u {Y}) 
contradicting that M k C ( yi V y) . 
(2) Let M E Min(Normal( y), <z), and let y’ be such that M k C( y’) (such y’ 
exists because M is normal). Since 8 # Mod( C( y)) c Min(Normal( y), <x), then 
there is N such that N k C(y) and N =z M (recall that <s is total). From Fact B.9 
we have M k C( y V y’) and using Fact B.6 as before we get M + C(y) . 
170 J. Lobe, C. Uzca’tegui/Art@cial Intelligence 89 (I 997) 149-I 71 
What we have just proved implies that & = {y E S: y k LY} and also that the result 
holds for abducible formulas, i.e., 
y i_ 8 iff y k-w 6. 
Using this remark and the function F defined in Fact B.4 we have 
F(o) = v{y: y E S} = v{y E s: y k a}. 
Hence F(a) = Fck (a) (where Fc’, defined in Definition 2.9, is the selection function 
associated with k). Then we have 
+ws iff F(a) i_, 6 (by Fact B.4) 
iff Fe!(o) bw S (from the remark above) 
iff F,i”(a) k 8 (since Fcb (a) is an abducible formula) 
iff a/y6 (by AA for i_). 0 
Now we can prove Theorem 2.13 based on Theorem 3.8. 
Theorem 2.13. Let (2, Ab) be an abductive framework and b a consequence relation. 
The foltowing are equivalent: 
(i) i_ satisfies the rules of system CM (i.e., it is a cumulative monotonic rela- 
tion), the rule Ab-Or, the Abductive Axiom, Ab-Consistency and the following 
constraint: for every o E .Z and every a, c~ k o. 
(ii) There is a simple cumulative model W = (S, 1) such that b= bw where S is the 
collection of abducible formulas consistent with Z, for every y, y’ E S we have 
Z(Y) C Mod(2U {y}), l(r V Y’) = l(r) U Z(Y’) and l(y) nMod(y’) C I(Y’). 
(iii) There is a domain theory 2’ > 2 such that for every abducible formula y, 
C U {y} is consistent if and only if 2’ U {y} is consistent, and i_= k-2). 
Proof. (i) + (ii): Since Monotony clearly implies Rational Monotony and Loop (recall 
that transitivity follows from monotonicity in the system C [ 15]), then from Theorem 
3.5 we know there is a total pre-order <-_ over Mod( 2) such that for the corresponding 
abductive model W = (S, I, 4) we have k= bw. We will show that + is the empty 
relation and 1 has the desired properties. 
(a) Let yi, y2 E S, we claim that yi V y2 p ly;, i = 1,2. Otherwise, towards a 
contradiction, suppose yi V y2 b 1~1, then by transitivity yi b 1~1, hence yi FL, 
which contradicts the hypothesis of preservation of consistency for abducible formulas. 
Therefore, as in Fact B.5, we obtain C( yi V ~2) = C( y1 ) n C( ~2). From Fact B.3 
we know that Mod(C(y)) = l(y) f or every y E S, thus Z(rl> U I(y2) C I(YI V ~2). 
Therefore yi 5 y2 and y2 _i yi. In other words, < is the empty relation. Notice also 
that from Fact B.l(iv) we have l(yi V ~2) =Z(yr) U/(yz). 
(b) It remains to be shown that l(y) n Mod( y’) C l(y’) for y, y’ E S. In fact, 
when N and N’ are normal models then N <p N’ and N’ <x N. Therefore, when 
N E Min(Mod(SU {y}),<x) and N k y’, then N E Min(Mod(Xu {y’}),<~), i.e., 
NE l(y’). 
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(ii) =+ (iii): Let .X’ be the theory whose models are U{l(r): y E S}. Then 2’ C 2 
and for every abducible formula y we easily see that y E S if and only if 2 U {y} is 
consistent, and also, if and only if 2’ U {y} is consistent. We only need to show that for 
every y E S, I(y) = Mod( 2’ U {y}). One direction is obvious from the definition. For 
the other direction, let N k 2 U {y}, then for some y’ E S we have that N E Z(y’). 
Then from the hypothesis in (ii) we obtain that N E l(y). 
(iii) + (i): This was already shown in Section 2. i? 
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